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MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES IN NURTURING A SAFE WORK ENVIRONMENT
T. W. Camm, Montana Tech, Butte, MT

ABSTRACT

ROOT CAUSE

As engineers, we are trained to use logical, rational problem
solving to insure our mines operate at maximum efficiency. We tend to
use the same technical approach to design safety into all mining
systems. This works well for machines, but not so much for the human
component. Recent insights in the field of behavioral economics
provide useful ideas for addressing the fact that we are driven by
emotions more often than by rational thought. Understanding the
nonrational aspect of human behavior is an important piece of any
safety system design.

There are many reasons ethically and practically to take safety
seriously. A not trivial practical reason is the ever-present relationship
between operating mines and the Mine Safety and Health
Administration (MSHA). We are all aware of the two-page Fatalgrams
issued by MSHA to provide a brief description of every fatality that
occurs in mining.
What every professional working in mining should be familiar with
is the subsequent report of investigation that is issued by MSHA at the
conclusion of investigating a fatality. These documents are available to
the public on their website. One section of particular interest to
managers and engineers is the “Root Cause Analysis” section. This
section specifically describes failures by management to prevent the
fatality from occurring, beginning the analysis with some form of the
following:

INTRODUCTION
The most common economic model is based on humans making
rational decisions; that given the proper information, we will make a
logical, rational decision based on what is best for ourselves (Ariely,
2009, p. xviii). In many cases this is an accurate description of how we
make decisions. As an engineer, I was trained to apply the precision of
mathematics and logic to solve problems. As an engineering professor,
I now teach this approach to bright young minds preparing them for a
life of professional effectiveness as practicing engineers.

“An analysis was conducted to identify the most basic
causes of the accident that were correctable through
reasonable management controls” (MSHA, 2012, p. 14).

That said, we are not only rational. Daniel Kahneman, winner of
the Nobel Prize in Economics, describes a model for how we think
(Kahneman, 2011). System 1 is the part of our mind that is fast,
intuitive, and emotional; while our logical, slower, and deliberative mind
is System 2. According to Kahneman’s model, System 1 runs
automatically, most of what you think and do originates in System 1.
System 2 takes over when things get difficult, including the application
of math and logic, and the resolution (or avoidance) of conflict.

In this particular fatality, the 11th coal fatality in 2012, a truck
driver died when he was ejected from his truck and struck by the truck.
A toxicology report revealed a substance in his system which likely
impaired his judgment, and he was not wearing his seatbelt. The
resulting root cause analysis found four cases where the mine operator
(that would be the management and professional staff) failed to
provide proper training and instruction that would have prevented the
fatality. This finding of failure on the part of management was despite
the mine having a current, approved Part 48 training program.

As engineers, we would typically assume that we operate in
System 2 mode most of the time. This is where the model becomes
useful, for Kahneman points out two important aspects of the dynamic
between the two systems in our mind. First, System 1 has biases,
systematic errors that lead to answering questions with an easier
answer (rather than a right answer) before System 2 is engaged.
Second, we can be blind to the obvious, and also be blind to our
blindness. Complicating things further, System 1 cannot be turned off
(Kahneman, pp. 24-25).

Now, I will readily admit that there are many instances where
management is partly to mostly to blame for injuries and even fatalities
at a mine site. The point I am trying to emphasize here is that
regardless of culpability, management will be the first to be blamed in
an MSHA report of investigation for a fatality. Whether it is an
explosion at a silver mine (MSHA, 2013) with four root causes, or a
machinery-related death at an underground coal mine (MSHA, 2014)
with only one root cause, management will be identified as the source
of a failure that led to the fatality.

Returning to Dan Ariely, behavioral economics, also called
judgment and decision making (JDM), is the study of the emotional
aspect of decision making, when humans make choices that seem to
defy logic and rationality. In fact, this became the title of his book on
the subject, Predictably Irrational (Ariely, 2009). We are really far less
rational than the assumptions of standard economic theory would
suggest, and beyond that our irrationality is often predictable—it
happens the same way, again and again (p. xx). We make decisions
that have a rational veneer, but they originate in an emotional desire
for something we crave deep down (p. 53).

SYSTEM SAFETY
One approach characterizing safety is to view the mine as an
integrated system. An approach developed for a research project by
the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) is a
safety system model that contains four components: economics,
engineering, work environment, and human factors (Camm & GirardDwyer, 2004). This model provides an approach to integrate the
insights from behavioral economics into the overall system of a mining
operation.
Engineering
Engineering design is a critical component of safety. Large strides
have been made in reducing the number of mining fatalities over the
previous decades, and improvements in engineering have played a
significant role in these lives saved. The proper selection of equipment,
work process, mine layout, and maintenance all contribute to the safe
and effective operation of a mine.

Understanding the dynamic of how emotion relates to logic is
important when designing and implementing a safety system at a mine.
While current approaches to safety stress the importance of each
individual in developing a safe work environment, there are particular
responsibilities that apply to managers and engineers. An example is
the attitude of regulatory agencies.
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Economics
A mine must be profitable to continue to operate. From a safety
standpoint, not only are the direct capital and operating costs
important, but also costs associated with productivity, indirect costs,
and intangible costs. Intangible costs include the costs not incurred by
a safe operation that avoids injuries and fatalities.

4)

Work Environment
In this model, work environment includes physical agents,
chemicals, noise, dust and visibility. Many of these factors are
specifically addressed by MSHA regulations, and it is the responsibility
of the engineers on site to insure systems are in place to meet these
regulatory requirements through work design and PPE use.

Skills training—companies often make the error of
instituting a new system without adequately training workers
to fit in the new system.
Consistent role models—this starts at the top with
management leading, but also includes colleagues modelling
the desired new behavior.

The Irrational Side
To build upon the model of their colleagues, Aiken and Keller
(2009) expanded on the four steps outlined above by addressing the
irrational aspects of change management. Human nature often gets in
the way of implementing even the best, most logically, rationally
thought-out plans for change. First, what motivates you does not
necessarily motivate your workers. Second, and related to the first, is
that much of the energy spent telling would be better spent listening.
This relates back to Ariely and Kahneman, if your workers do not feel a
sense of participation in the story of the change, they are unlikely to be
emotionally connected to the change. There should be a balance of
risk and reward; “we are more willing to take risks to avoid losing what
we’ve got than we are to gain something more. Some anxiety is useful
when it comes to spurring behavioral change” (p. 104).

Human Factors
Training and work design are key components of human factors in
a safety system. In addition, physical capability, perceptual motor skills
and abilities, intellectual aptitude, and personality also contribute to the
human factors part of the system. Individuals can continue to function
in a poorly-designed system, but this will usually lead to increased
stress, human errors, and under-utilization of equipment (Chapanis,
1996, p. 19).

Role Models
Conventional managers believe that by acting as role models they
can bring about the desired change. While the active participation of
managers is important, they often mistakenly believe they already “are
the change.” Why is it that leaders often commit themselves to be role
models of the desired behavior, and then nothing happens? “The
reason for this is that most executives don’t count themselves among
the ones who need to change….The fact is that human beings
consistently think they are better than they are” (Aiken & Keller, 2009,
p. 105).

Each of these four components interact in an efficient, properly
designed safety system (figure 1.).

Any attempt to institute change must be well thought out, logical,
and rational. But, it must also recognize that humans do not always
behave rationally. It must be perceived by all participants to be
worthwhile, relevant to their lives, and fair.
FINAL THOUGHTS
The word profession is from the Latin professus, which means to
affirm publicly. In the past, individuals who had mastered the esoteric
knowledge of a discipline had the responsibility to use their power
wisely and honestly (Ariely, p. 285). This still holds true today. Every
person at a mine has an obligation to operate safely; but it falls on the
professional staff of engineers and managers at a mine to insure the
design, work process, and equipment fit together in a way to minimize
the possibility of an injury or fatality.
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MANAGING CHANGE
One of the dilemmas facing any professional is change
management. Humans do not like change, particularly when they are
in a system they know and think works just fine. McKinsey & Company,
the well-known management consulting firm, has published a series of
articles over the years providing guidance in instituting change in
organizations. Lawson and Price (2003) outlined four conditions for
change at the deepest level—cultural change. This is the type of
change most managers seek when attempting to enhance the safety
system at a mine. The four steps:
1)
2)

A purpose to believe in—a compelling story that engages
the emotions of workers.
Reinforcement systems—any new systems, incentives,
and processes must be consistent with the change.
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